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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
THE ISSUE OF OBJECTIVITY SERIES (1)
OBJECTIVITY
DAGFINN FØLLESDAL
One of the hotly debated issues in science, particularly social science, is whether
science can be objective. On the one side one has traditional scientists, like Ole-Jørgen
Skog, who not only do science, but also reflect on methodology, and who hold that
there are standards in science that distinguish good science from bad science and that
any good scientist has to live up to.
On the other side one has relativists of different varieties, post modernists and
others, who get a lot of attention by holding that we all are confined to a subjective
perspective, that one perspective is as good as another and that talk about objectivity is
just a rhetorical attempt by those who are in power to suppress those who have
diverging views.
Oddly enough many who hold this view are inspired by Edmund Husserl, who often
gets credited for having put an end to the relativist tendencies which were dominant
towards the end of the nineteenth century. What has attracted many to Husserl is that
he focused on the subjective perspective, the structuring of our surroundings that we
perform in all our activities. This idea was taken over by Sartre in his philosophy of
freedom and has been eagerly taken over by subjectivist constructivists of all varieties.
What these followers of Husserl have not noted, is that Husserl supplemented his
analysis of the subjective perspective with rich and detailed studies of intersubjectivity
and from this again turned to objectivity. His subjectivist followers do not seem to
have read this part of his work. The whole first volume of Husserl's Logical
Investigations is a detailed refutation of relativism, and in his later work he presents
argument after argument against relativistic views. His subjectivist followers never
discuss these arguments and seem not even to be aware of them.
Instead of presenting more arguments against relativism which will probably not
be read by those they are directed against, I will here confine myself to a more
constructive effort; I will put forth a view on objectivity, what it is and whether it is
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achievable.
It is often said that the most important feature of science, which distinguishes it
from non-science, is that science is objective or at least attempts to be objective. The
presumed objectivity of science is a principal reason why we have confidence in
science, depend on its results and support it economically. Also the scientist's attitude
to his own activity depends on a firm conviction that the results of science are
universally valid and do not just express the scientist's private opinions.
But is science objective? There is no doubt that much of what is called science is
far from objective. Many claim also that science cannot be objective and that the ideal
of objectivity is harmful, by giving rise to an exaggerated trust in science and its results.
In order to be able to take a stand on this question we obviously first have to know
what is meant by ‘objectivity’. The word is used in many senses, and often it seems to
be used without any clear sense. Some define the word as something that has to do with
our data or observations, as does Johan Galtung in the following passage:
If repeated observations of a constant phenomenon and by the same observer give constant
data, the observation is said to be intrasubjective, or dependable. If repeated observations
of a constant phenomenon by different observers give constant data, the observation is said
to be intersubjective.
….
These two conditions, dependability and intersubjectivity, can be used together as definiens
for the loosely used term ‘objectivity’.1

There are two problems with this definition. First, objectivity is normally conceived as
something we should strive for, but it is doubtful that we should always restrict
ourselves to data that are intersubjective. In psychology and social science one often
uses data that have been obtained by introspection. People report what they feel, see,
believe or wish. In the childhood of behaviorism one tended to reject such data, but
gradually one has come to accept them because they are corrigible.2 The theories that
are supported by them, must also fit in with data that are intersubjectively controllable
(for example observable behavior), and if there is a conflict, one will now and then
reject the data one obtained by introspection. Introspection is therefore not regarded as
something infallible. Paradoxically, this is a reason why introspective data are
admissible in science.
Secondly, and this is the most important: A main consideration in debates about
objectivity is the selection of data and the balancing of the various hypotheses and
theories against one another. These are questions that are not touched upon in the
definitions above. One may be objective in the sense above but select one's data in a
very special way, which makes it easy to support the conclusions one likes. Objectivity
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Johan Galtung 1967, 28.
William Alston 1972, 71-102.
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in the most common and interesting sense of the word must therefore be defined in a
different way.
Many maintain that objectivity must be defined by reference to scientific method
in general. One must stipulate conditions both on the collection of data and on the
formation and testing of hypotheses. When one goes sufficiently far in this direction,
‘objectivity’ becomes practically synonymous with ‘scientific’. This does not seem
reasonable. ‘Objectivity’ is used not only about scientific works, but also about news
reports, articles and other oral, written and pictorial presentations of a topic. It is
therefore natural to assume that objectivity is a feature of the end product and the way
it is presented and not of the methods that have been used to obtain the results that are
presented.
Another fairly common view, especially with regard to science, is that objectivity
means value free. Scientific works shall be value free, they shall not contain value
judgments or incite to action. This would exclude most of Ole-Jørgen's work, since his
work has certainly incited to action. The requirement is rather dubious, even for a
strictly scientific work. A scientific work will often function normatively and inspire
action even if it does not contain any explicit value judgments. And even explicit value
judgments are permitted if they are well supported by the work. However, as will be
argued below, use of strong emotional words should be avoided if one aims for
objectivity.
A third, related, view is that ‘objectivity’ means 'not taking sides' in the sense that
all different sides of an issue shall be given the same amount of space or attention. This
requirement may apply to the final results or to the research process leading up to them.
This condition is also somewhat problematic: how many sides does an issue have,
and how many pages must a scientific work have in order to give them all the same
amount of space? Nevertheless we are here getting on to what is probably the main
concern behind much of the discussion of objectivity: one wants to obtain a picture
which is not “one sided”, “biased”, “distorted” or what one might want to call it. But
how can one spell out this conception of objectivity, and how can one achieve it?
We will propose the following definition, which fits what we are after better than
the definitions we have looked at earlier, but which still needs improvements:
A presentation (for example a scientific treatise, a TV program, a news report, an article)
is objective if and only if the beliefs and attitudes it creates in the receiver would not have
been changed if one had had full knowledge of the issue, with all information and all
alternative hypotheses.

It is here tacitly understood that the presentation concerns a particular time. A report of
the condition of a ship at a given time that states that all is well does not lack objectivity
if the ship shortly afterwards runs into a mine and sinks. The information about the
accident will change our belief of how the condition of the ship is now, but not of how
it was before the accident.
Of course, nobody has such complete information about a case. However, the
definition gives us a practical and simple test of objectivity, which we will discuss in a
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moment. The improvements that are needed in the definition are primarily steps to
increase its precision. We must, for example, distinguish between changing a belief and
deepening it. If a presentation is objective, further information shall not make us reject
anything in the presentation, but we may obtain a more precise understanding of it, a
more complete picture, and so on. We should also avoid the use of expressions that are
strongly emotionally charged. Compare, for example, a news report that says: “The red
hordes roll forward” with one that states “The freedom movement is advancing”. If one
permits the use of emotionally strongly charged words, alternative descriptions of the
same state of affairs will easily change our attitudes and thereby make objectivity
impossible.
Even if our definition needs many such improvements, we believe that it is a step
in the right direction. It seems to capture the point in most discussions of objectivity.
And even the way it stands in its vague form, it can be applied. The test of objectivity
is very simple:
Is there information/data, or hypotheses which are well supported by these data, that are
not included, but which, if they had been included would have changed the beliefs or
attitudes of the receiver?

If the answer is no, the presentation is objective, if the answer is yes, the presentation
is not objective, and by pointing to information that changes the picture one can show
where the presentation is deficient.
Note that the definition and our discussion of it do not require that an objective
presentation should be complete. Given the richness in all that surrounds us, this would
be an unrealistic goal, and a presentation that tried to scrape together everything, would
be very dull, pretty unreadable. It is no excuse for a lack of objectivity that the theme
one is writing about is enormous and that one has to make a selection. What is decisive
is which selection one makes. It is clear from the definition that if one wants to be
objective, one must not leave out information which is likely to change the receiver's
beliefs or attitudes.
Objectivity as it is defined here is an ideal which perhaps few presentations conform
to. Even the best researcher can have the misfortune to leave out information that would
change the picture. His work is thereby not objective. Which attitude we should take to
the researcher himself depends on how excusable it was to overlook this information.
Did the researcher know it and leave it out intentionally? Had he familiarized himself
less with the subject matter than what can reasonably be expected from a researcher?
Or was the new information surprising, even for those who knew the topic well? Stood
the author to gain something when the information was overlooked? Economically,
politically, or with respect to his prestige, because it would overthrow his earlier results
or theories?
A lack of will to objectivity often springs from a desire to maintain one's old
opinions and prejudices. Or one avoids bringing up sides of an issue that may be
uncomfortable for oneself or what one stands for.
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Lack of objectivity is most easily discovered in presentations by others that do not
fit in with one's own view. This may be due to the fact that one then often has
information that has not been included in the presentation and that, if it had been
included, would change the reader’s view. One has then reason for regarding the
presentation as not objective. If, however, one cannot point to any such missing
information, but nevertheless reacts against the presentation, then one should ask
oneself: Am I the one who is lacking objectivity? Have I become so obstinate that I am
not willing to change my view and my attitudes? When this presentation stands in
conflict with my view, is it because it contains information that I have not known? Or
have I had this information and not been willing to take it into account? Such questions
should press themselves upon us when one is reading a presentation with which one
disagrees, but which one cannot accuse of lacking objectivity. That objective
presentations pose this challenge to us, is perhaps the most important reason why we
should be objective, not only in science, but also in polemics.
However, also objectivity has its limits. A high degree of objectivity is necessary
for good science (and as we just noted, desirable also outside science). But it is not
sufficient for good science. One can easily be objective if one chooses a theme that is
simple and easy to deal with, perhaps a detail that nobody has considered earlier.
However, such problems are rarely important, interesting or intellectually challenging.
Good science may emerge when one takes up problems which are important for our
practical life or for the further development of science, and which are also difficult.
That they are difficult does not mean that they will remain difficult for ever. Good
science often makes difficult problems easy, by opening a good way of approaching
them. It thereby also makes it easy to be objective where it earlier was difficult.*
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